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This contribution links psychological models of emotion regulation to sociological accounts
of emotion work to demonstrate the extent to which emotion regulation is systematically
shaped by culture and society. I first discuss a well-established two-factor process model
of emotion regulation and argue that a substantial proportion of emotion regulatory goals
are derived from emotion norms. In contrast to universal emotion values and hedonic pref-
erences, emotion norms are highly specific to social situations and institutional contexts.
This specificity is determined by social cognitive processes of categorization and guided
by framing rules. Second, I argue that the possibilities for antecedent-focused regulation,
in particular situation selection and modification, are not arbitrarily available to individuals.
Instead, they depend on economic, cultural, and social resources. I suggest that the sys-
tematic and unequal distribution of these resources in society leads to discernible patterns
of emotion and emotion regulation across groups of individuals.
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INTRODUCTION
Emotion research over the past decades has increasingly por-
trayed emotions as adaptive responses to evolutionary demands,
firmly rooted in biological and psychological response mecha-
nisms. Studies have consistently emphasized their functions in
individual (Levenson, 1999) and social or cultural terms (Kelt-
ner and Haidt, 1999; Thoits, 2004). As such, emotions have been
shown to contribute to cognitive processing, decision-making, and
memory formation as well as to the emergence of social bonds and
relationships, the coordination of social action, and the mainte-
nance of social order. But this has not always been the case. From
the Greek philosophers to the Scottish moralists and the mod-
ern counseling literature, passions and emotions have often been
considered as disturbing and irritating occurrences in human life,
in particular in domains requiring calm deliberation and ratio-
nal thought. Therefore, and although emotions are ubiquitous to
human affairs, the ability to control and manage one’s emotions
has become a key driving force of civilization and a hallmark of
modern societies (Elias, 1939/1978). We aim at not forgetting our-
selves when faced with indignity, at still being courteous at some
boring dinner party, or at getting rid of that gloomy feeling. It thus
seems as if there occasionally was something “undesirable” or even
potentially “dangerous” to emotions, both in view of social bonds
and relationships as well as with respect to subjective experience
and individual behavior.
This suggests that emotions’ evolutionary founded “wisdom of
the ages” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 820) is not indeterminately appropri-
ate and may in fact jeopardize one’s goals and social integration
(Gross et al., 2006). Clearly, changing environmental conditions
alter emotion’s response contingencies, and not all emotional reac-
tions are always adaptive and individually or socially beneficial, in
particular in contemporary societies. Or, as Gross (1999, p. 558)
put it: “Physical and social environments have changed out of all
recognition from those that shaped our emotions, and techno-
logical advances have dramatically magnified the consequences
that our emotional responses may have for ourselves and oth-
ers. An irritable swipe that once scarcely raised a welt, is now
translated with the greatest ease into a fatal car accident or gun-
related homicide.” It seems that the basic architecture and some
of the mechanisms that elicit emotions have remained largely
unchanged over the course of evolution, whereas the social and
cultural environments have changed dramatically. Part of this mis-
match obviously gives rise to the desire to alter and manage existing
emotional states.
Despite their evolutionary roots, emotions have proven to
be highly adaptive to dominant cultural and social conditions
(Hochschild, 1983; Thoits, 2004; Boiger and Mesquita, 2012).
Norms, rules, values, and the social practices through which they
are learned and internalized all contribute to the cultural shaping
of emotion. From this perspective, it can be argued that emotions
are always regulated in a longer-term understanding and in a sense
that they are “calibrated” to culture and society (Vandekerckhove
et al., 2008; von Scheve, 2012).
This “one-factor” view of emotion regulation holds that “emo-
tion and regulation are one” (Kappas, 2011), and that the regula-
tion of emotion is not limited to an actual emotion episode, but
rather extends throughout ontogenetic development. In this vein,
some have argued that“emotion and emotion-control are part and
parcel of the same processes and any scientifically viable theory
of emotion must also be a theory of emotion-control” (Kappas,
2008, p. 15; see also Campos et al., 2004; Kappas, 2011). Much
like sociological and psychological one-factor views highlight the
importance of the social and cultural embeddedness for emotion
regulation, recent biological and physiological accounts emphasize
the importance of individuals’ ecological embeddedness. Beckes
and Coan (2011), for example, argue that social proximity and
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interaction should not only be taken into account as indicators
prompting (intentional) emotion regulation in an encounter, but
also as referents of the degree of embeddedness into social net-
works that signal a “baseline” of social integration, which in turn
renders the organism more or less susceptible to emotional arousal.
Although such longer-term regulatory processes tend to oper-
ate implicitly and automatically (Mauss et al., 2008), they also
clearly include instances in which existing emotions are delib-
erately altered to meet certain social or cultural requirements.
Mostly, these instances also contribute to the adaptation and
fine-tuning of emotion to a socio-cultural context, although they
equally well serve individual goals. This regulation of an existing
emotional state – such as when getting rid of one’s anger or ampli-
fying a good mood to outward joy – corresponds to the analytical
“two-factor”perspective on emotion regulation (see Campos et al.,
2004, p. 377). This perspective assumes one set of processes related
to the elicitation of emotion (first factor) and a second set directed
at the regulation or control of an existing emotion (second factor).
Based on these premises, issues in the regulation and man-
agement of emotion have become a lively field of inquiry in
the social and behavioral sciences. Traditionally, different disci-
plines have been concerned with different aspects of emotion
regulation. The behavioral sciences, above all psychology, have
developed advanced micro-level models that focus on the individ-
ual processes and mechanisms underlying emotion regulation. In
the social sciences, in particular in sociology, research is dom-
inated by macro-level accounts of social norms and rules to
which individuals refer in modulating emotional experience and
expression.
In this contribution, I ask how psychological two-factor models
of emotion regulation can be extended to accommodate “macro-
level” social and cultural influences on the regulation of emotion,
as they have been documented by sociological and cultural emo-
tion theories. Often, research on the influence of culture and
society on emotion regulation has focused primarily on one-factor
models and long-term influences (Denzin, 1990; Thoits, 1990).
Here, I will primarily take a two-factor perspective to highlight
the impact of the social world from the standpoint of method-
ological individualism or situationalism. The aims of the article
therefore are to link both perspectives to achieve a better under-
standing of the social embeddedness of emotion regulation, to
show how psychological and social-cultural processes interact in
emotion regulation, and to pave the way for an exchange between
disciplines that have mostly attended to the regulation of emotion
in disparate ways.
I will first briefly review Gross’s (1999) well-established process
model of emotion regulation and highlight key processes that are
particularly susceptible to social influences or even require infor-
mation from the social environment. In a second step, I discuss
sociological approaches to emotion management and regulation,
in particular the widely adopted notion of “emotion work.” Here, I
will emphasize the role of social norms and different institutional
settings to which they belong. In a third step, I will frame these
determinants of emotion regulation as emotion regulatory goals in
Gross’s process model. Moreover, I will argue that the possibilities
of antecedent-focused emotion regulation, in particular situation
selection and situation modification (Gross and Barrett, 2011), are
not arbitrarily available to individuals. Instead, the ability to select
and modify situations depends on different kinds of resources, in
particular economic, cultural, and social resources, which affect
regulatory effort.
INDIVIDUAL PROCESSES IN EMOTION REGULATION
Although two-factor theories of emotion regulation differ in their
details, most of those taking an individual or dyadic perspective
converge in their definitions and understandings of what emotion
regulation is. According to Gross, “emotion regulation refers to
the processes by which individuals influence which emotions they
have, when they have them, and how they experience and express
these emotions. Emotion regulatory processes may be automatic
or controlled, conscious or unconscious, and may have their effects
at one or more points in the emotion generative process” (Gross,
1998, p. 275; italics omitted).
According to this view, fully understanding emotion regula-
tion requires a compatible definition of what an emotion is.
Although this is constantly debated in emotion research (e.g.,
Kappas, 2002), recent psychological and sociological approaches
converge on a componential definition of emotion. In this light,
emotions are elicited by the evaluation or appraisal of (internal
or external) cues that are in one or another way relevant for the
individual. These evaluations then trigger a pattern of coordi-
nated responses tendencies that are supposed to facilitate adaptive
behavior. These responses tendencies form the basis of an emo-
tion episode and include experiential, cognitive, behavioral, and
physiological components (Gross, 1999; Scherer, 2005; Thoits,
2007).
Emotion regulation in principle extends to most of these com-
ponents and involves changes in expressive behavior, subjective
feeling, or physiological responses (cf. Gross, 1999, p. 557; Gross,
2002, p. 282). This definition encompasses not only negative emo-
tions but also the processes whereby emotions are strengthened,
maintained, or weakened, regardless of their valence. It also allows
to make a distinction between the conscious and intentional regu-
lation of an emotion on the one hand, such as changing the topic of
conversation that is getting annoying, and automatic and uncon-
scious regulation on the other hand, such as always appearing to be
grateful when receiving a present, even if the present comes close
to an offense. However, this perspective on emotion regulation
largely excludes conceptions of emotion regulation that refer to
the regulatory functions of emotions. In these cases, emotion reg-
ulation is used to indicate emotions capacity to regulate some other
mental or physiological process, for example perception, memory
retrieval, or decision-making (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007). Also,
this understanding highlights the intrapersonal aspects of emotion
regulation and excludes the regulation of other individuals’ emo-
tions in social interaction, which is often referred to as “emotion
management” (Lively, 2010).
A well-established psychological theory of emotion regulation
that closely aligns with the above definitions is Gross’s model of
emotion regulation (e.g., Gross, 1999). Understanding emotion
regulation as a process, the model assumes the existence of an emo-
tion episode or situation and identifies five distinct stages at which
this episode can be modulated. These stages can be further dif-
ferentiated in “antecedent” (aiming at changes in the antecedents
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of an emotion) and “response” oriented regulation (changing the
emotional response-components). Figure 1 represents the basic
structure of the model.
The model is organized along a time axis representing analyti-
cally distinct phases in the elicitation of an emotion. Antecedent-
oriented regulation kicks in at an early stage in the emotion
generative process and focuses on changing the situational cir-
cumstances that give rise to an emotion in the very first place.
Habitually avoiding unsuitable or unpleasant topics of conver-
sation is an example of this type of regulation or dismissing an
employe who is a frequent cause of anger. Response-oriented reg-
ulation, on the other hand, refers to strategies employed when an
emotion, including most of its response-components, have already
manifested. These strategies are directed at changing the effects or
immediate consequences of an emotion, such as the suppression
of a facial expression.
Antecedent-oriented regulation encompasses several possibil-
ities: the selection and modification of the emotionally relevant
situation, the deployment of attention, and the (cognitive) inter-
pretation or appraisal of the present situation (cf. Gross, 1998,
2002, p. 282). Situation selection as the first possible step of
antecedent-oriented regulation aims at seeking, creating, or avoid-
ing situations in which actors expect certain emotions to occur,
either based on experience or actual exposure. If actors are unable
to actively seek or avoid a situation, the modification of a situation
still allows changing its emotionally relevant constituents in such
a way that a desired emotion is experienced or an undesired is
avoided.
Actors can also change attentional deployment and focus on
selected aspects of a situation or actively disregard others to regu-
late emotions. Ignorance of certain facts or persons is a well-known
strategy in this regard. A closely related approach is the active
and deliberate modification of one’s (cognitive) evaluation of
the situation or of a certain aspect thereof. This “reappraisal” or
re-interpretation involves the re-framing of a situation and the
re-examination of the preceding appraisal that elicited the actual
emotion state (e.g., Urry, 2009). Such reappraisals or cognitive
changes imbue a situation with a meaning different from an orig-
inally assigned meaning and consequently give rise to changes in
the related emotion (Gross, 2002).
Response-oriented regulation taps changes in the various con-
sequences or components of an emotion. Good examples of this
type of regulation are the suppression or evocation of a facial
expression or the regulation of physiological reactions, such as
efforts to calm down or to curb motor reactions. The key difference
between both kinds of regulatory effort is that antecedent-focused
regulation usually aims at changing or producing an emotional
reaction in its entirety or simply at disposing an existing emotion.
Response-focused regulation rather aims at dealing with the con-
sequences of an emotion and usually does not target the entire
emotional response (although, of course, one could argue that
getting rid of the phenomenal component of an emotion is pretty
much the same as getting rid of an emotion in its entirety).
EMOTION REGULATION GOALS
Given the strategies of emotion regulation illustrated above, an
interesting question is why and to what ends people engage in
emotion regulation at all. One of the most straightforward and
empirically substantiated answers is for hedonic pleasure (Rusting
and Larsen, 1995; Vastfjall et al., 2001). However, there is a broad
array of other things that people value that are not necessarily
associated with pleasure, for instance social conformity, health,
or utility (e.g., Higgins, 2006; Tamir, 2009), that might prompt
emotion regulatory behavior. Nevertheless, accounts of pleasure
and pain as motives of emotion regulation have dominated the
literature (Tamir and Mauss, 2011) whereas the role of values and
goals has been much more at the heart of self-regulation than
emotion-regulation research.
Generally, understanding the goals and motives of emotion
regulation also involves understanding the things people value
in affective and emotional terms. The focus on hedonic plea-
sure in recent research is rooted in the nature of emotions as
intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant experiences. In this vein, the
standard view holds that people value and aim at seeking pleas-
ant emotions and at avoiding unpleasant ones. However, it is not
completely clear what makes a pleasant emotion pleasant. Tamir
(2009) has questioned the assumption that people always want
to feel “pleasant” emotions. Instead, she highlights the role of
short-term and long-term benefits and argues that “unpleasant”
emotions, such as anger, are often sought to aide long-term goal
attainment. Similarly, research on esthetic emotions indicates that
allegedly unpleasant emotions, for example intense sadness, are
often actively sought and enjoyed (e.g., Oliver and Woolley, 2010).
Clearly, the regulation of emotion is closely tied to the feelings
that are preferred and valued by a person. These values and pref-
erences for certain emotions in certain situations develop in social
FIGURE 1 | Basic process model of emotion regulation reproduced from Gross and Barrett (2011, p. 12).
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and cultural contexts and are internalized during the course of
socialization. Studies have demonstrated that there are marked
differences between cultures in view of which emotions are valued
and which are not (Eid and Diener, 2001). These studies, however,
are usually based on an understanding of “culture” as primarily
depending on geopolitical location and language, such that one of
the most investigated differences is that between supposedly “col-
lectivist” Asian and “individualist” Western groups. Also, research
has demonstrated robust cross-cultural differences in the valua-
tion of what Tsai et al. (2006) term “ideal affect.” Ideal affect refers
to the affective states that people value, prefer, and ideally want to
feel. It is at the core of what a “good feeling” actually is (Tsai, 2007).
From a sociological point of view, the question of the role of
values and goals is interesting because it warrants the assump-
tion that there are patterns and regularities in emotion regulation
across large numbers of individuals. Departing from cross-cultural
psychological approaches, however, sociology is more interested
in cultural differences within societies, for example across social
classes or in different institutional settings. Therefore, the follow-
ing section discusses select sociological views on the regulation and
social control of emotion that put social norms and institutional
settings at the forefront.
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROCESSES IN EMOTION
REGULATION
Although many sociological accounts of emotion regulation would
stress the general importance of a one-factor account, a promi-
nent line of inquiry focuses on the regulation of emotion that
is in principle in accordance with the processes outlined by psy-
chological research. Clearly, these accounts often emphasize the
importance of social practices, symbolic interaction, and norma-
tive orders over individual processes (Thoits, 2004), but they still
rely on assumptions on how the two interface with one another.
Interesting in this regard, Hochschild (1979) promoted two
possible approaches to the“social ordering of emotive experience.”
The first is based on the analysis of the“social factors that induce or
stimulate primary [. . .] emotions,” whereas the second one is “to
study secondary acts performed upon the ongoing non-reflective
stream of primary emotive experience”(Hochschild, 1979, p. 552).
In her now classic studies on the social regulation of emotion, she
focuses on the second option and takes a two-factor perspective.
She coins the “secondary acts” that are performed on primary
emotive experience “emotion work” (Hochschild, 1979). Origi-
nally developed in an investigation of the emotional demands of
service-sector employes, emotion work corresponds to the “act of
trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling” or
simply “to ‘work on’ an emotion” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 561). It is
closely related to – and in fact an extension of – Goffman’s ideas on
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Goffman, 1959). As such,
her account is strongly influenced by the principles of symbolic
interactionism.
Hochschild assumes that emotion work in principle serves two
goals: to either evoke or to suppress an emotion. Her account of the
processes and mechanisms underlying emotion work is inspired by
the ways in which professional actors evoke and shape emotions,
and she makes explicit reference to Stanislavski’s method acting
paradigm (Hochschild, 1983) to distinguish two types of emotion
regulation: “deep acting” and “surface acting” (Hochschild, 1983,
p. 48). Here, “deep acting” is mainly used synonymously to “emo-
tion work,” meaning the management of a feeling or an emotional
state, whereas “surface acting” is limited to modulating only the
behavioral expression of an emotion. Surface acting thus equals
Goffman’s (1959) description of impression management in social
interactions.
Empirical research has almost exclusively focused on one spe-
cific instance on emotion work, namely “emotional labor.” Emo-
tional labor denotes emotion work that is performed in orga-
nizational and economic contexts. It does not primarily pursue
individual goals, but is rather seen as an instrumental strategy to
increase economic success of an organization. Hochschild’s classic
study on emotional labor of flight attendants and employes in debt
collection agencies provided an empirical illustration of the con-
cept (Hochschild, 1983, p. 89–161) as does a body of more recent
studies in the sociology and psychology of work and organization
(e.g., Brief and Weiss, 2002; Fineman, 2003).
EMOTION NORMS
In contrast to much of psychological research on emotion regula-
tion (but note the more recent studies mentioned above), the con-
cept of emotion work does not primarily rely on individual norms
and standards. Rather, its point of reference are socially shared
(albeit at times latent) norms and rules that govern regulation. In
analogy to“display rules”(Ekman, 1972, p. 225), Hochschild terms
these socially shared norms directed at emotional experience feel-
ing rules. A feeling rule “delineates a zone within which one has
permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to
the situated feeling” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 565). These rules spec-
ify which emotions are regarded as appropriate and expected in
particular situations. Based on this understanding, feelings rules
are a subset of prescriptive social norms that indicate what “ought
or ought not to be the case” under specific circumstances (Opp,
2002, p. 132). More specifically, these norms demarcate the inten-
sity, direction, duration, and objects of emotions appropriate in a
situation (Hochschild, 1979; Thoits, 2004).
Feelings rules thus are presumed to guide emotion regulation
much in the same way as other social norms guide behavior.
Although the coercive and compelling nature of social norms
is a matter of debate, the desire for social conformity, main-
tenance of cooperation, circumvention of material sanctions or
social exclusion, and averting negative emotions such as shame
and embarrassment are amongst the most frequently mentioned
reasons for emotion regulation (e.g., Bicchieri, 2006; von Scheve,
2010). Hochschild notes that feeling rules are effective in principle
in two ways: as individual expectations of how we (and probably
others) usually or “normally” feel in a specific situation (e.g., we
expect to feel bored during the lecture of a certain colleague) or
as social expectations how we should feel in this situation (prob-
ably excited; Hochschild, 1979). This view offers striking parallels
to how social norms are conceptualized in social philosophy and
psychology. The first is quite similar to the concept of descriptive
norms, i.e., norms resulting from the perceptions of what most
others (including the self) actually and usually do (Cialdini, 2007).
This is how recurrent individual experiences solidify into emo-
tional norms or conventions. Individuals develop expectations
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about emotions based on their own experiences and experiences
of others (Thoits, 2004, p. 363). The second view indicates the
existence of an injunctive norm that prescribes a certain kind
of behavior in a specific situation (ibid.). Although conceptually
related, the first is based on social information and the second is
based on social evaluation, both of which can equally be applied
to feeling rules.
Importantly, feeling rules are conceived of as elements of an
overarching ideology, a broader system of normative social order.
In the same way as normative orders guide all sorts of behav-
iors through norms and values, for example fairness, reciprocity,
or generalized trust, they guide emotions and their expression.
Whereas the concept of “ideal affect” (Tsai, 2007) and the culture-
specific values ascribed to different emotions are usually not
situation-specific, feelings rules are closely tied to specific social
situations. A defining criterion of values and also of moral norms
is their universality within a society and across situations (Turiel,
1983). If I value freedom, honesty, and fairness, I do so regardless
of a specific situation. The same can be said about certain emo-
tions: for example, we do not value envy or rage in most modern
western societies, mostly regardless of the situation. In contrast,
feeling rules as instances of social norms are bound to specific sit-
uations. We are supposed to feel sad at funerals and happy on New
Year’s Eve.
Thus, from the perspective of emotion work, the social dimen-
sion of regulation not only stems from the social sharing of feeling
rules, but also from mechanisms that establish links between feel-
ing rules and (classes of) social situations. In sociology, these
mechanisms are realized by “framing rules.” Such rules govern
the ways in which “we ascribe definitions or meanings to situa-
tions” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 566), for example “this conversation
is just a friendly chat” vs. “this conversation is already part of
a job interview.” These rules for defining situations, based on
certain situational cues or components, imply the validity of
situation-specific feeling rules (and other social norms). These
ideas have already been spelled out by symbolic interactionism,
for example in Goffman’s (1974) Frame Analysis, and by the soci-
ology of knowledge, in particular Berger’s and Luckmann’s (1966)
treatise on The Social Construction of Reality. More recently, psy-
chological research on social and socially situated cognition has
illuminated the processes and mechanisms underlying framing
rules (Kunda, 1999; Bless et al., 2004). This work emphasizes the
automaticity and rapidity with which individuals categorize situ-
ations according to certain perceptual cues and the fundamental
impact of automatic categorizations on behavior, for instance in
view of stereotype activation, person perception, and emotion
(e.g., Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000; Smith and Semin, 2004,
2006; Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009).
Importantly, framing rules and the validity of feeling rules not
only depend on situational information, but also on ascribed and
achieved characteristics (e.g., social roles, status, power, gender,
age) relative to the situation at hand. For example, a mother and
her adolescent child in a social encounter with a third person
will frame the situation differently based on, for example, their
age and social roles. A mother might frame the situation as an
insulting one and feel justified in feeling embarrassed, whereas
the child might frame the situation as a joke and feel justified
in feeling amused. Likewise, an encounter between a superordi-
nate and an employe might carry framings that allow humor for
the higher status individual and preclude humorous behavior for
the subordinate. In institutionalized contexts, framing and feel-
ing rules differ for customers and employes, as demonstrated by
Hochschild’s (1983) classical study. This way, societies are threaded
with normative orders that lead to socially differentiated patterns
of emotion work.
Feeling rules not only shape emotions but also reflect the dom-
inant views of emotion, their relative importance, and the socially
accepted ways of dealing with them. Thus – in addition to valued
feelings – they play a crucial role in shaping the “emotional cul-
ture” of a society, which Thoits (2004) defines as “beliefs about
the nature, causes, distributions, value, and dynamics of emotions
in general as well as of specific feelings” (p. 362). Social psycho-
logical research has demonstrated links between emotion cultures
and social behavior in various domains (e.g., Nisbett and Cohen,
1996; Ijzerman et al., 2007; Ijzerman and Cohen, 2011). Likewise,
social historical scholarship has revealed links between changing
norms and values and the emotion culture of a society (Thoits,
2004, p. 360f; Cancian and Gordon, 1988; Stearns, 1993; Illouz,
1997; Reddy, 2001).
Moreover, studies in emotion work and feeling rules often adopt
a“critical”stance because of the potential social, psychological, and
physiological consequences of emotion work (cf. also Gross, 2002).
It is frequently assumed that feeling rules create a tense relation-
ship between socially expected emotions and actually experienced
emotions. This tension gives rise to “emotional dissonance” or
“emotional deviance” (Hochschild, 1983; Thoits, 1990; Jansz and
Timmers, 2002), which has to be eased by means of emotion work.
In the long run, the constant need for emotion work is supposed
to lead to the “alienation” from one’s own feelings (Hochschild,
1983).
EMOTION REGULATION AND EMOTIONWORK: TWO SIDES
OF THE SAME COIN?
Although many sociological and social science inquiries into emo-
tion work are not primarily concerned with the individual com-
ponents of emotion regulation, but rather with its ideological,
organizational, and economic contexts (often in the sense of social
criticism), there are far-reaching parallels with psychological mod-
els of emotion regulation. Investigating these parallels may not
only advance our understanding of the principles of emotion
work and emotion regulation, but will allow us to better (a) esti-
mate and predict the individual consequences of emotion work
in social institutional settings, (b) delineate the social and cultural
embeddedness of emotion regulation, and (c) apprehend the sys-
tematic social shaping of emotion. Some of these linkages and
conceptual overlaps have been described by Grandey (2000), but
with an emphasis on emotional labor and organizational settings.
Grandey highlights similarities between Hochschild’s (1983) con-
cepts of deep and surface acting in emotional labor on the one
hand and Gross’s (1999) process model of emotion regulation on
the other hand. She uses this integrative view to develop a model
of emotional labor that profits from an in-depth consideration of
organizational processes and the demands of paid work (as out-
lined by the sociology and psychology of work and organizations)
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as well as form detailed accounts of situational cues, individual
processes, and long-term consequences of emotion regulation.
Here, I will re-iterate several of her points, but instead of focusing
on organizations and emotional labor aim at a more general and
“large-scale” approach at understanding the social embeddedness
of emotion regulation.
Process models of emotion regulation give insights into the var-
ious distinct stages of emotion regulation and regulatory processes
in relation to different junctures in the phases of emotion elic-
itation and the components of an emotion or emotion episode.
I therefore start with the basic assumptions of Gross’s (1999)
process model of emotion regulation illustrated above and use
Hochschild’s (1979) account of emotion work to locate and spec-
ify the social and cultural determinants of emotion regulation
within and on top of this model. I will also draw on other theories
in the sociology of emotion to further extend Gross’s model in
view of the social distribution of resources that are necessary to
implement certain strategies of regulation. Figure 2 illustrates the
way in which deep acting and surface acting can be understood as
parts of the emotion regulatory process.
The emotion antecedent strategies of attentional deployment
and cognitive change – or reappraisal – largely correspond to
Hochschild’s concept of deep acting or emotion work in a narrower
sense (Hochschild, 1979; Grandey, 2000). Because Hochschild’s
work has a focus on emotional labor in organizational settings,
it seems obvious that she emphasizes these cognitive regula-
tion processes over situation selection and modification, mostly
because employes are limited in their capabilities to select and
modify situations. According to Hochschild, emotion work may
consist of three elements: cognitive, bodily, and expressive. We will
deal with the bodily and expressive components later and focus on
the cognitive element. Cognitive strategies in models of emotion
work refer to attempts to “change images, ideas, or thoughts in the
service of changing the feelings associated with them”(Hochschild,
1979, p. 562).
Most interestingly, although hidden in a footnote, Hochschild
(ibid.) explicitly relates these cognitive strategies to appraisal theo-
ries of emotion, in particular Lazarus’s (1966) approach, which are
also foundational to process models of emotion regulation. How-
ever, emotion work is only seldom seen in this light of appraisal
theory. It can be understood as an attempt at “recodifying” situa-
tions or at reclassifying them into “previously established mental
categories” (ibid.). This deliberate and conscious recodification
(reappraWisal) acts upon previous automatic codifications and
interpretations (appraisals) that gave rise to the initial emotion.
Response modulation in Gross’s process model resembles
the idea of surface acting in theories of emotion work. Here,
Hochschild’s (1979, p. 562) ideas of regulating the bodily, i.e.,
physiological, components, or “symptoms” of emotions (e.g., res-
piratory control) are in line with Gross’s view of response-oriented
regulation. The same holds for the expressive components which
are, strictly speaking, a class of bodily reactions. Importantly, and
in contrast to the process model of regulation, Hochschild is inter-
ested in bodily and expressive regulation primarily in view of the
their effects on the regulation of the underlying feeling, for exam-
ple trying to smile not only for “interactive” reasons, but also to
change the phenomenal feeling (ibid.). In line with Gross, she
acknowledges that antecedent- and response-oriented strategies
often go hand in hand.
Importantly, in uncovering the social determinants of emo-
tion regulation, both strategies have to be linked to certain norms
and values that serve as emotion regulatory goals, in particular
to the feeling rules outlined above. The concept of feeling rules
(or emotion norms, more generally) is an important addition to
the process model, because it is highly situation-specific. Whereas
accounts of emotion regulation that emphasize cultural values as
emotion regulation goals take a more universal approach (e.g.,Tsai,
2007), feeling rules presuppose situation-specific framing rules
indicating their validity. As shown in Figure 3, feeling rules pri-
marily inform deep and surface acting or attentional deployment,
cognitive change, and response modulation.
Feeling rules are less suited to apply to regulatory strategies
that aim at situation selection or modification because they are
situation-specific. This is why their influence on emotion regu-
lation is focused on deep and surface acting in this model. By
accounting for the influence of feeling rules, the process model
of regulation can accommodate emotion regulatory goals that are
socially shared, highly interactive, and situation-specific, and at the
same time systematically evoked in accordance with institutional
settings and corresponding framing rules and social cognitive
processes of situation perception.
Therefore, the significance of framing rules in constituting the
social dimension of regulation is closely linked to situation selec-
tion and situation modification strategies. Given that individuals
FIGURE 2 | Deep acting and surface acting in Gross’s process model of emotion regulation. Based on Gross and Barrett (2011, p. 12).
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FIGURE 3 |The influence of resources, framing rules, and feeling rules on emotion regulation. Based on Gross and Barrett (2011, p. 12).
are able to actively seek or avoid situations or change certain
parameters of an existing situation, they simultaneously alter the
framing rules that are associated with a situation. Selecting or
modifying situations usually results in different frames that are
applied and different rules that go along with the new or mod-
ified situation. These in turn imply changes in situation-specific
feeling rules in such a way that they are more compatible with the
regulatory goals an individual actively pursues.
Importantly, framing rules and associated feeling rules are not
given by nature or stand firmly without alternatives. Hochschild
(1979, p. 566) emphasizes that they have an “ideological stance,”
that they are in fact the “bottom-side” of ideology. Conceiving of
ideologies more broadly as the major competing cultural systems
of meaning making, this means that there are always alternatives
as to how a prevailing situation is to be framed according to which
ideological stance. For example, feminist or gender mainstreaming
proponents in a committee meeting will probably apply different
sets of framing rules than, say, the very conservative representa-
tives. Thus, framing rules as well as associated feeling rules always
reflect a particular order of sense-making that is prevalent in a
social institutional setting. However, changing the framing rules
for specific situations is not an easy task. Although they may have
an ideological and “socially constructed” background, framing
rules become deeply embodied and ingrained into how we per-
ceive the world that they are hardly alterable voluntarily and on a
moment-to-moment basis.
Moreover, feeling rules are not only situations-specific, but their
validity also depends on the individuals involved in a situation, in
particular on their social roles and status positions and related
social categories. For example, research has aptly documented the
different feeling rules that are in place in one and the same sit-
uation for men and women (Cancian and Gordon, 1988; Brody
and Hall, 2000; Simon and Nath, 2004) or people of different age
(von Salisch, 2001; Hepworth, 2007). This systematic distribution
of feeling rules across the social spectrum (both, vertically and
horizontally) should thus lead to marked differences in emotion
regulatory behavior across social groups and institutional settings.
Finally, as indicated in Figure 3, the possibilities for antecedent
regulation, in particular for situation selection and modification,
depend on individuals’ capacities to actually select and change a
situation. These capacities are constrained by several factors, in
particular the institutional setting and available resources. Some
institutional settings such as third-sector employment with fre-
quent customer contact leave only little room for selecting situa-
tions at will. Also, situation selection aiming at emotion regulation
in certain areas of the family or in educational settings may be hard
to achieve. As a general rule, the more formalized an institutional
setting is and the more individuals are bound to a specific social
role, the less likely becomes situation selection as a strategy of
emotion regulation.
Moreover, selecting and modifying situations requires adequate
resources to do so. This includes cultural resources in the broadest
sense, such as knowledge on how to change or select a situation;
it may require economic resources as a means to actually imple-
ment selection or modification, and this strategy may also need
the adequate social resources, in particular status and power (e.g.,
Kemper, 1978), that enable individuals vis-à-vis others to change
a situation. Importantly, as social science research has repeatedly
documented over the past decades, these resources are not arbitrar-
ily distributed in society, but highly inter-correlated and associated
with social structure (e.g., Massey, 2008). Systematic social differ-
ences in the available resources to implement certain strategies of
emotion regulation should thus – in conjunction with norms and
regulatory goals – lead to discernable social patterns in emotion
regulation.
DISCUSSION
In this article I have outlined an approach to understanding the
social dimension of emotion regulation by integrating micro-level
process models and the concepts of emotion work and feeling
rules. From a sociological perspective, two-factor process mod-
els offer insights into the regulation of emotion that are closely
linked to the processes of emotion elicitation and the immedi-
ate situational context of an emotion episode. Understanding the
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broader and longer-term “regulation” of emotion, as demanded
by one-factor models, is more effectively accomplished by other
paradigms in the sociology and psychology of emotion, such as
social structural and cultural approaches (e.g., von Scheve and
von Luede, 2005; Boiger and Mesquita, 2012). On the other hand,
psychological process models profit from consideration of ways to
incorporate the social and cultural embeddedness of regulation,
as is already done in works highlighting the role of emotion values
(e.g., Tamir, 2009).
In addition to these works, the various linkages discussed herein
highlight situationally specific social and cultural parameters of
emotion regulation. Using the concepts of deep acting and sur-
face acting, I have outlined the ways in which feeling rules as
specific instances of a broader class of emotion norms (includ-
ing, for example, display rules) serve as emotion regulatory goals
reflecting (injunctive) social expectations and (descriptive) per-
sonal standards. I have also highlighted the importance of framing
rules which link situational context to the validity of specific feel-
ing rules. It has become clear that emotion regulation in social
contexts is also fundamentally dependent on prevailing “ideolo-
gies” or prevalent systems of meaning making that may differ
across groups and categories of individuals. Finally, I have empha-
sized that the emotion antecedent strategies of situation selec-
tion and modification strongly depend on available resources,
which in turn are systematically and unequally distributed in a
society.
CONSEQUENCES OF EMOTIONAL LABOR AND EMOTION REGULATION
This specification of process models of emotion regulation may,
for example, help in achieving a better understanding of the indi-
vidual and social consequences of emotion regulation, a critically
debated topic in sociology. Hochschild (1983), for example, has
expressed concerns about the alienation from one’s own feelings
and the psychological and physiological strains that go along with
emotional labor (see also Grandey, 2000). In this regard, studies
on the consequences of emotion regulation have revealed sig-
nificant differences between deep acting and surface acting and
between antecedent- versus response-oriented regulation (Gross,
2002). If, in fact, theoretical assumptions made by models of emo-
tion regulation concur sufficiently with those of emotion work
and emotional labor, insights from existing research might aide
in clarifying the actual consequences of emotional labor. Con-
versely, and based on the conjecture that emotion regulation in
private and organizational settings are fundamentally different
from one another – based on the corresponding situational fram-
ing rules – empirical studies could tap into these differences and,
for instance, account for the situational context (private vs. orga-
nizational) as a moderating variable in assessing the psychological
and physiological consequences of emotion work and emotion
regulation.
INTRA-SOCIETAL VARIATION IN EMOTION REGULATION
Given the existing studies on cultural differences in emotion reg-
ulation (e.g., Mauss et al., 2008), the integrative model developed
here may to help to investigate systematic differences in emotion
regulation within societies. Sociology is classically concerned with
examining social differentiation at various levels. One (vertical)
approach is to conceive of differentiation as stratification and to
look at the unequal distribution of and access to resources across
society, for instance in different social classes. Another (horizontal)
approach is to investigate social differentiation based on different
tastes and preferences, as is evident in different lifestyles. Bourdieu
(1984) has famously offered and account of linking both perspec-
tives using the concept of cultural capital. Recently, there is an
increased interest in these linkages in social psychology. Studies
have demonstrated ways in which “class culture” impacts behav-
ior, including emotion. For example, Piff et al. (2010) have shown
that social class systematically influences prosocial behavior (see
also Kraus and Stephens, 2012) and Rackow et al. (2012) show how
social inequality is related to the frequency of experiencing anger
and anxiety. In this vein, the proposed model may help in under-
standing the emotion culture – and its constitutive feeling and
framing rules – of social classes and the emotion-related tastes and
preferences of certain lifestyles. Just like Bernstein (1971) theorized
on restricted vs. elaborated codes of language use in lower and
upper classes, classes could be characterized by different patterns
of emotion regulation. Empirical studies can investigate whether
such differences exist at all and how they are brought about, for
example by differences in feeling rules or the resources that allow
for situation selection and modification in emotion regulation.
THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SHAPING OF EMOTION
Finally, the extended model developed in this article may pro-
vide new insights into the long-term cultural shaping of emotion.
If individuals are required to adapt their emotions to prevail-
ing feeling rules as instances of ideologies or “emotion regimes”
(Reddy, 2001), then situation-specific emotion regulation is a
process that clearly contributes to this shaping. Much has been
speculated on the role of social norms and practices in the
culture-specific shaping of emotions. Many of these macro- or
discourse-level approaches fall short of recognizing that emotions
are also fundamentally psychological and bodily phenomena and
seldom provide elaborated models of how to link culture, cog-
nition, and emotion in an integrative framework. A model of
emotion regulation that accounts for both, the social influences
and the psychological mechanisms through which these influences
are mediated can enhance our understanding of how exactly cul-
ture and society shape emotion. In conjunction with the existing
one-factor approaches to emotion regulation (e.g., Kappas, 2011),
two-factor models that decidedly consider individuals’ embedded-
ness into culture and social structure are instructive, for example,
in empirically investigating differences between adaptive processes
of socialization and internalization in relation to general emotion
values and those based on explicit and situation-specific normative
obligations.
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